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As part of the reconfigu-ration of social struc-tures and beliefs inrecent decades, LatinAmerica has transi-
tioned from a virtual Catholic
monopoly to a plural and diverse
Christian majority characterized by
the spread of Pentecostalism and a
growing number of people claiming
no religion at all. 
Secularization does not mean the
disappearance or privatization of reli-
gious beliefs but rather their continu-
ous reordering.  Capitalism’s multiple
modernities are not linear, nor are
they evolutionary; they are indeter-
minate and multidirectional, and no
one can predict their outcomes.
Going beyond what is normative
and prescriptive to analyze concrete
situations is a challenge that scientific
studies cannot ignore. 
The historical foundation of the
nation-state (alternating democracies
and dictatorships under multiple neo-
colonialisms), policies to expand citi-
zenship—or not, the type of social
framework, the formation of social
movements and the role played by
Christian movements—Catholicism
during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, along with Evangelicalism in
the twenty-first—are a central part of
the socio-religious narratives that have
dominated our national histories. 
The crisis of the state, along
with privatization and deregula-
tion, has dislocated not only our
material existence but also our
symbols, memories and expecta-
tions. During the longest demo-
cratic period the region has ever
known, life is full of contradic-
tions, both among states and with-
in them—on the one hand, the
heterogeneity of poverty and the
penal/repressive control of popula-
tions destabilized by unemploy-
ment; on the other, the extension
of new rights of citizenship to vast
sectors of the population accompa-
nied by an aggressive rebuilding of
state and civil society capacities. 
C O M M E N T A R I E S
French nun Yvonne Pierron speaks during an ecumenical celebration in honor of French nun Leonie Duquet, kidnapped and murdered by navy forces
during Argentina’s military dictatorship. Photo: Daniel Garcia/AFP/Getty Images.
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Categories such as time, space and
promise have been reformulated in
such a way that—especially for
young people—time has been trans-
formed into something instanta-
neous, into a permanent presence
that makes it hard to plan for the
future.  The world-space has been
expanded by new information tech-
nologies, and globalization and the
collective promises of a better tomor-
row have lost credibility, and this
leads to many individual exit plans. 
Meaningful institutions—the state,
family, labor unions, churches, politi-
cal parties—no longer create long-
term legitimacies and are being eroded
in our so-called “liquid modernity.”1
Religious Institutions and Beliefs
A quick look at institutions and
beliefs on the continent shows us an
active market in salvation and a
broad religious field with strong
demands and multiple sources of
supply. Religiosity does not end with
institutions and religious beliefs are
not only channeled through clergy.
In Brazil, Catholics make up
73.8% of the population and
Evangelicals 15.6%, ranking it as one
of the Latin American countries with




Evangelicals). The category “no reli-
gion” is as high as 8%. 
Ricardo Salas confirms the grow-
ing plurality of religion in Brazil.
“The Catholic Church may still be
the majority religion (73%),” he
writes, “but there has been sustained
growth by Evangelicals (16%) (who,
on the one hand, tend to look to
their neighborhoods for meaning
and, on the other, tend to be more
indifferent toward democracy than
Catholics) and other religions (4%).” 
Uruguay, perhaps the most secular
country in Latin America, has the
highest rates of religious indifference
in the region. Unaffiliated believers
account for 23.2% of the population
and atheists and agnostics 17.2%.
Uruguay has the lowest percentage of
Catholics (47.1%) of any country in
the Southern Cone. 11% of
Uruguayans identify themselves as
Evangelical and a little more than
2% as belonging to other religions. 
In a study that combines census
figures and ethnographic research,
Mexican researchers using data from
the National Institute of Geography
and Statistics (INEGI) analyzed the
complex world of religious identity
in their country. Renée de la Torre
and Cristina Gutiérrez Zúñiga
found the “territories of religious
diversity” in Mexico today to
include 88.9% Catholics, a little
more than 5% Evangelicals, 2.5%
“non-Evangelical Biblical religions”
and 3.52% no religion. “The dissi-
dence is composed of a diversity of
religious minorities, internally very
disparate, where we find both firmly
consolidated religions and a pulver-
ization of religious offerings.”
The results of Argentina’s First
Academic Poll of Religious Beliefs,
carried out in 2008, also reflect the
strong inroads made by Christian
religions other than Catholicism.
Argentina is still Catholic majority,
but other denominations have
expanded and diversified: 76.5% of
respondents identified themselves as
Catholic, 9% as Evangelical and
11% as indifferent (in other words,
atheists, agnostics and no religious
affiliation). The rest were divided
between Jehovah’s Witnesses (1.2%),
Mormons (0.9%) and other religions
(1.1%), among them Judaism, Islam,
Umbanda or other African-inspired
religions, Buddhism and Spiritism.
One noteworthy finding is that more
Argentines have no religion or reli-
gious education (11.2%) than are
Pentecostal (10.4%).
If we focus on the religion with
the most followers in Argentina,
Catholicism, we find that three-quar-
ters of Catholics practice their beliefs
without the Church as an intermedi-
ary (65% practice their religion on
their own and 10% never do).
Among Evangelicals, in contrast, the
split is more even: 55.8% connect
with God through their church while
42.4% say they do so on their own. 
As we have seen, Christianity, the
overwhelmingly majority religion on
the continent, is undergoing a pro-
found transformation. On the one
hand, the Catholic Church (which
has difficulty maintaining a dialogue
with emerging sects, obsessed as it is
with the topic of sex and tangled up
in its own dogmas and bureaucratic
authority) is losing its hegemony to
countless and diverse religious groups
that “negotiate” their public pres-
ence, foremost among them the
powerful and vital Evangelical move-
ment. On the other hand, we are
witnessing an “emotionalization” of
beliefs that cuts across Christian
groups that prioritize organization,
authority and emotional community
over dogma. Faith healing, speaking
in tongues, ecstatic dancing, entering
into trances, creating a climate of
human warmth and seeking a direct
connection to the sacred with no or
little institutional mediation, along
with “hyper-modern” use of the mass
communications media and links to
more “pragmatic” sources of financ-
ing are a part of both the
Charismatic Catholic Renewal move-
ment and the many different
Pentecostal Evangelical groups.    
In response to this religious
nomadism, however, communitarian
Catholic and Evangelical groups have
emerged that offer certainty, security
and totality to small groups, with the
goal of achieving long-term continu-
ity.  Among Catholics, groups like
the Legionaries of Christ, Institute of
the Incarnate Word, Knights of
Christ the King, New Catechume-
nate, etc. and, among Evangelicals,
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the Assemblies of God, God Is Love,
Universal Church of the Kingdom of
God and others create their own
authorities, legitimacies, memories
and relationships.  The Catholic
groups are in a state of permanent
tension with local ecclesiastical
authorities and have varied links to
Rome. The Evangelical groups can be
likened to small salvation businesses
that act as micro-enterprises, with
local inputs and legitimacy limited to
their leader and congregation. The
network structure makes these groups
permeable but complicates the for-
mation of shared national or regional
policies. Ultimately, individualization
and communitarianism are part of
the same social and cultural process.
Long-term studies should keep in
mind that Christian institutions main-
tain historical relations with the state,
culture and society through negotia-
tions and by the power they accumu-
lated in each nation state.
Christianity—especially Catholicism
—is a social space, not just an institu-
tional one, with strong roots in Latin
American society that go beyond the
number of churches or clergy. A com-
mon and differentiated universe of
belief feeds “diffuse Catholic imaginar-
ies” that compete with other imaginar-
ies in the current context of globalized
communications, but that endure as
symbolic capital always ready and
available for use by different religious
actors and constituting “natural conti-
nuity” in a “long Catholic tradition.”
It is these different Catholic imaginar-
ies that have been at stake in Latin
America since the end of the Cold
War, the triumph of the market and
US global hegemony: a Catholicism
based on certainties, another on emo-
tions and a third on asceticism.  Once
more the question is whether to con-
ciliate or confront “liberalism,” US
imperial policy, modern values,
hedonism and individualism, and
whether the effort should be based at
the level of the dominant or popular
sectors, the institution and/or society.
While many Christian groups and
movements join in criticism of
unbridled market economics and the
external debt, other issues, among
them complicity with power,
imposed dogma, and opposition to
state-mandated reproductive health
and sex education create strong divi-
sions both within Catholic groups
and between the Church and impor-
tant segments of society. 
The weakening of the social state
and the privatization of public policy
has created new spaces for religious
groups, especially those with a strong
institutional presence. One example
is the increased role of religious
groups in public education and social
assistance.  As a result, neither the
state nor political parties can claim
hegemony over popular spaces;
instead, an assortment of religious
groups enjoy so much legitimacy in
this sphere that the state and party
leaders are compelled to consult them
and invite their participation in
social, educational, cultural and
employment-related activities.   
In addition, the loss of credibility
of government and party promises
and mediation in the redefinition of
the public and private spheres (an
effort in which the women’s move-
ment has played a central role) has
opened a whole new range of spaces
for religious leaders and their agen-
das. This explains the increasingly fre-
quent appearance of priests, pastors,
rabbis, imams and other religious
leaders in mediating or managing
social conflicts. They have more cred-
ibility as social actors than as “repre-
sentatives of the sacred” or for their
moral or religious recommendations,
and they have the ability to claim
greater institutional power.
Religious institutions do not con-
sider themselves to be on the margins
of political power, nor do state offi-
cials think of themselves as apart
from religion. We have seen the
emergence of a political-religious
sphere characterized by a back and
forth flow that merits more trans-
parency and analysis. Legal equality
among all religious groups (or the
effort to gain the same privileges as
those enjoyed by Catholicism), as
well as the quest for equality, justice
and inclusion for all men and
women, may represent a potential
source of conflict among religions. 
In conclusion, we must remember
that in Latin America historically the
great majority of believers have not
been active members or daily partici-
pants in any religious group. Latin
America does not have the same tra-
dition of mass parochial culture that
characterized Europe for many cen-
turies. These are not “apathetic” or
“passive” men and women who are
“objects of manipulation” by their
churches. Their religious beliefs
influence their daily lives and provide
answers to important challenges at
the level of identity, belonging, fami-
ly structure, etc. In situations of gen-
eralized anxiety or uncertainty, reli-
gious ethics are one of the main
sources of meaning. The panorama
of experiences ranges from believing
without belonging to religious indi-
vidualism. By affirming the primacy
of emotional experience, Pentecostal
groups—whether Catholic or
Evangelical—do not respect, or sim-
ply reject, the imposition of religious
authority through institutional sym-
bolic violence.  n
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1 Concept introduced by Zygmunt Bauman,
referring to the privatization of ambivalence
and increasing feelings of uncertainty, a kind
of chaotic continuation of modernity.
(Editor’s note)
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